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INTRODUCTION 
 
When a dispute arises and the parties are from different states or 
more than one law within a single jurisdiction applies to the dispute, 
which law should govern? Choice-of-law rules answer that question. 
In the early years following the founding of the United States, state 
law was fairly uniform, so it usually did not matter which state’s law 
was applied.1 However, in subsequent years, states enacted statutes 
that conflicted with those of their sister states.2  
Choice-of-law “is a device for choosing among states’ substantive 
laws.”3 Writing in 1927, Justice Benjamin Cardozo called conflict of 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., International Studies, 1997, Rhodes College.  
1 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the 
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1945). Justice Jackson’s article, which was 
given as the fourth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture on December 7, 1944, 
provides excellent insight into the origins of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 
Supreme Court’s full faith and credit jurisprudence through the early 1940s. 
2 Id. 
3 Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 
BRANDEIS L.J. 21, 40 (1998). 
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laws “one of the most baffling subjects of legal science.”4 At that 
time, American conflict of laws jurisprudence was in its infancy, and 
U.S. courts were following a single choice-of-law methodology.5 O
twenty-five years later, Dean William Prosser wrote, “[t]he realm of 
the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, 
and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about 
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The 
ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in 
it.”
ver 
                                                
6 Today, resolving conflicts between competing state laws is a 
complex endeavor because states have adopted a variety of choice-of-
law approaches. 
Conflicts in bankruptcy cases usually occur when the debtor and 
creditors are from more than one state, but they can also involve a 
conflict between U.S. bankruptcy law and a foreign nation’s 
bankruptcy law.7 In determining the parties’ rights in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the bankruptcy court must first determine whether state or 
federal law governs the parties’ rights.8 If state law governs a right, 
then the court must determine which state’s law applies.9 For example, 
a court will look to state law to determine whether a contract, on 
which a creditor’s claim is based, is valid.10 If the contract was made 
 
4 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (Columbia 
Univ. Press 1945) (1928). 
5 The terms approaches and methodologies are all used in describing various 
choice-of-law schemes. Generally, the choice-of-law approaches or methodologies 
provide the broad choice-of-law standards, which include specific choice-of-law 
rules for various areas of law. 
6 William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
7 Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other 
Liens in International Bankruptcies, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 171 (1998). 
8 John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 
531, 533 (1989). 
9 Id. 
10 “Claim” is defined as a: 
 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
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between parties from different states and the contract would be valid 
under the law of one state but not the other, a choice-of-law issue can 
arise.  
With the exception of the choice-of-law rule provided in 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) for determining which state’s exemptions a 
debtor may claim to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate,11 
federal bankruptcy law does not provide choice-of-law rules for 
bankruptcy cases or guidance on how state law conflicts should be 
                                                                                                                   
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured; or  
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if 
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such 
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or 
unsecured.  
 
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006). 
11 An individual debtor may exempt property under the: 
 
State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of 
the petition at the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been 
located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the 
filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been 
located at a single State for such 730-day period, the place in 
which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately 
preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-
day period than in any other place.  
 
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). Congress amended the provision in 2005 to prevent forum 
shopping by debtors who move from one state to another prior to filing bankruptcy 
to take advantage of a more generous state exemption statute.  In re Jevine, 387 B.R. 
301, 303 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have stated that 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), formerly 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), is a 
federal choice-of-law provision that does not incorporate the state choice-of-law 
rules. See In re Drenttel, 403 F.3d 611, 613–14 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Arrol, 170 F.3d 
934, 936 (9th Cir. 1999) (“This is a federal choice of law in which the choice has 
been made. That choice is the applicable state exemption law, and in this case the 
exemption is California’s statutory homestead exemption. Whatever California’s 
conflicts of law jurisprudence may be is simply irrelevant.”).  
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resolved.12 The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
whether federal courts should apply state choice-of-law rules in 
bankruptcy cases or other federal question jurisdiction cases.13 Klaxon 
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. requires federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the choice-of-law rules of the 
state in which the court is sitting.14 However, Klaxon has never been 
extended to federal question cases.15 Thus, it remains an open question 
whether federal courts should apply state or federal choice-of-law 
rules in bankruptcy cases.  
Left to grapple with the choice-of-law issue on their own without 
any clear direction from the Bankruptcy Code16 or the Supreme Court, 
the federal courts have been divided over the correct approach in 
bankruptcy and other federal question cases. Some courts apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the forum state and cite Klaxon as authority, 
while other courts reject application of Klaxon and apply a federal 
common law choice-of-law rule.17 A third group tempers its approach 
by considering whether there is a compelling federal interest before 
applying the forum state’s choice-of-law rules.18 
The Seventh Circuit recently had an opportunity to take a position 
on whether state choice-of-law rules or a federal choice-of-law 
approach should be applied in bankruptcy cases, but it declined to do 
                                                 
12 See Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 883 (2006); Cross, supra note 8, at 534; 
In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 89 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). 
13 See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), 
reh’g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942), reh’g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942). The Supreme Court 
had an opportunity to determine whether federal courts should apply federal or state 
choice-of-law rules when exercising federal question jurisdiction in both cases but 
resolved the cases on other grounds. Vanston, 329 U.S. at 161–67; D’Oench, 315 
U.S. at 455–56. 
14 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
15 Gardina, supra note 12, at 907–09. 
16 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1527 (2006). 
17 Gardina, supra note 12, at 909–10. 
18 Id. at 910. 
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so.19 While the outcome of In re Jafari would not have been altered by 
the application of federal choice-of-law rules, the court failed to 
elevate discussion of the issue. If the Seventh Circuit had applied the 
federal common law choice-of-law approach used by the First and 
Ninth Circuits in bankruptcy and other federal question cases,20 the 
enlarged circuit split might have garnered the interest of Congress or 
the Supreme Court in resolving the issue.21 
The traditional and modern choice-of-law approaches are flawed, 
and legal scholars have advocated the creation of a new set of choice-
of-law rules.22 Application of state choice-of-law rules in bankruptcy 
cases results in inconsistent outcomes, which is at odds with the 
uniform nature of the federal bankruptcy system. The forum state’s 
choice-of-law rules can result in the selection of substantive law of a 
state that has little or no relationship to the dispute between the 
parties.23 In addition, the variety of choice-of-law rules, and therefore 
the options available for debtors or creditors seeking favorable state 
law, encourages forum shopping.24 Furthermore, litigation of choice-
of-law issues depletes the bankruptcy estate’s assets. Thus, all 
                                                 
19 In re Jafari, 569 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1077 
(2010).  
20 In re Vortex Fishing Sys., 277 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (bankruptcy case); 
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 
2000) (Railway Labor Act);  In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy 
case); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 976 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act); Edelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 861 F.2d 1291 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (Edge Act). 
21 See discussion of the circuit split infra Part II.B. 
22 SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION:  
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE ¶ 370. (2006) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, THE 
AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION]; Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts 
Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J 403, 415–16 (2000). 
23 See infra Part III.A.1. 
24 See infra Part III.A.2. An involuntary bankruptcy case may be filed by 
creditors to force a debtor into Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy pursuant to the 
requirements found in 11 U.S.C. § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code; thus, creditors also 
have the ability to forum shop. 
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creditors vying for a share of the assets are impacted by a choice-of-
law dispute. 
Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to address the issue and the 
limits that the Court has imposed for creation of federal common 
law,25 Congress should enact choice-of-law rules for bankruptcy 
proceedings, which it has the power to do under the Bankruptcy 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, or alternatively, under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.26 As the Supreme Court has stated, 
“‘[w]hether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state 
law is primarily a decision for Congress,’ not the federal courts.”27 
This Note explores the current choice-of-law methodologies used by 
the courts and the impact of choice-of-law rules in the bankruptcy 
context, and argues that Congress should enact federal choice-of-law 
rules for bankruptcy cases. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Bankruptcy Law Generally 
 
Bankruptcy law brings order to the financial chaos caused when a 
debtor becomes insolvent. While bankruptcy law has multiple goals, 
its primary purposes are to provide the debtor with a fresh start28 and 
                                                 
25 Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting 
O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (“The 
[Supreme] Court has said that ‘cases in which judicial creation of a special federal 
rule would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few and restricted.’”) 
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. 
art. IV, § 1. 
27 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
28 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The 
principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtor.’”) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991); 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (providing a fresh start “gives to 
the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which 
he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for 
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to ensure equitable distribution of the bankruptcy estate.29 Congress is 
authorized to enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that Congress has 
the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”30 Most states had 
insolvency or bankruptcy laws in place before the Constitution was 
enacted;31 however, the Founders were aware of the difficulties that 
courts would encounter in bankruptcy cases where the parties were 
from different states. In The Federalist No. 42, James Madison 
explained the need for providing Congress with the power to establish 
federal bankruptcy law:  
 
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy 
is so intimately connected with the regulation of 
commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the 
parties or their property may lie or be removed into 
different States, that the expediency of it seems not 
likely to be drawn into question.32 
 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197833 (the Bankruptcy Code), as 
amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
                                                                                                                   
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt”) 
(emphasis in original). 
29 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328–329 (1966) (“[A] chief purpose of 
the bankruptcy laws is ‘to secure a prompt and effectual administration and 
settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period[.]”) (quoting Ex parte 
Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 312 (1845); Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 
(1930) (“The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable 
distribution of the bankrupt’s estate among creditors holding just demands based 
upon adequate consideration.”). 
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
31 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 20.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 277–78 (James Madison) (The Modern Library 
ed., n.d.). 
33 Pub. L. No. 96-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
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Protection Act of 200534 (BAPCPA), is the current bankruptcy law. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code is federal law,35  it prioritizes, 
enforces, and either affirms or denies a number of rights, 
responsibilities, and remedies created by state law and sometimes by 
nonbankruptcy federal law.36 For example, because “[p]roperty 
interests are created and defined by state law,” state law must be used 
to resolve questions involving property rights in the bankruptcy 
estate’s assets “[u]nless some federal interest requires a different 
result.”37  
For an individual debtor, bankruptcy provides a fresh start by 
allowing the discharge of debts under Chapter 7 or by allowing the 
debtor to come up with a Chapter 13 plan to restructure and pay off his 
or her debts and discharge certain debts after successfully completing 
his or her plan.38 Businesses, with a few exceptions, can also either 
liquidate under Chapter 739 or take advantage of the reorganization 
provisions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to restructure 
their secured and unsecured debts, as well as their equity interests.40 
Creditors benefit under the bankruptcy process because it ensures an 
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets among creditors of the 
same class.41  
                                                 
34 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
35 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1527 (2006). 
36 Cross, supra note 8, at 535; Gardina, supra note 12, at 887–88. 
37 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).   
38 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007); COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, ¶ 1.01[1]. 
39 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). 
40 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, ¶ 1.01[1]. 
41 For example, the bankruptcy trustee has the power under 11 U.S.C. § 547 
and 11 U.S.C. § 550 to avoid and recover for the bankruptcy estate a prebankruptcy 
transfer of the debtor’s property to pay or secure the obligations of a creditor. By 
recovering the “preference,” no creditor is preferred to the detriment of another 
creditor. In enacting this provision, Congress stated that “‘[t]he operation of the 
preference section to deter ‘the race of diligence’ of creditors to dismember the 
debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the preference section—that of 
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District courts exercise original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334.42 District courts are permitted under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(a) to refer their jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases to 
bankruptcy courts, which were created as units of the district courts by 
28 U.S.C. § 151.43 All judicial districts have entered orders referring 
all bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts. 44  Under the criteria 
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 158, appeals from bankruptcy court orders, 
final judgments, and decrees can be heard by the district courts, the 
bankruptcy appellate panel (if one has been established by the circuit’s 
judicial council), or directly to the federal courts of appeals (if 
statutory criteria are met).45 The federal courts exercise federal 
question jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.46   
 
B. The Development of Choice-of-Law in the U.S. 
 
When a legal dispute between two or more parties occurs and 
significant aspects of a case are related to more than one jurisdiction, 
there must be a set of rules to determine which jurisdiction’s 
substantive laws apply.47 The body of law that generally tries to create 
solutions to these conflicts is called “conflict of laws,” and courts 
determine which state’s law to apply in a case using “choice-of-law” 
rules.48 Conflicts between laws most often arise vertically (between 
                                                                                                                   
equality of distribution.’”  Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 178 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6137). 
42 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, at ¶ 3.01[1]. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at ¶ 5.02[1]–[2]. 
46 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
47RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971). 
48 See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 at 1, § 1.2 at 3 (4th 
ed. 2004) (The term “conflict of laws” is currently used in the United States, 
England, and Canada, whereas the term “private international law” is used in 
Continental Europe and by some English writers.) 
 317
9
Ziebarth: Choice-of-Law Rules in Bankruptcy: An Opportunity for Congress to
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
state and federal law), horizontally (between different states’ laws),49 
or between laws of a state or the United States and those of a foreign 
country.50 Choice-of-law rules establish which state’s substantive law, 
or which law within a single jurisdiction, applies in a dispute.51 
Usually, the choice-of-law rule of the forum state is used to determine 
which state’s law will be applied in a case.52  
The Constitution addresses both vertical and horizontal 
conflicts.53 The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law trumps 
state law in conflicts between state and federal law.54 Horizontal 
interstate conflicts are addressed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
which provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.”55 Congress is also given the power to enact laws to regulate 
state compliance with the obligations of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, but it has rarely used this power.56 As a result, the resolution 
of interstate conflicts has generally been left to the states.57  
A significant complication in applying choice-of-law rules is the 
variety of state approaches that are currently used.58 States have the 
authority to enact choice-of-law legislation, but only Louisiana and 
                                                 
49 Conflicts between states will be referred to as “interstate conflicts” in this 
article. States involved in a conflict will be referred to as the “forum state” and the 
“foreign state.” 
50 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶ 4. 
51 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 3.1 at 120. 
52 Id. 
53 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶ 4. 
54 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
55 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
56 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶ 4. 
57 Id. 
58 Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal 
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1991). 
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Oregon have enacted comprehensive statutes.59 In the absence of 
choice-of-law rules that are incorporated in specific statutes, most 
courts have adopted and interpreted choice-of-law rules and 
methodologies that have been developed by legal scholars.60 A 2009 
choice-of-law survey found that the fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico follow five different methodologies in 
contract cases and seven different methodologies in tort cases.61  
Those methodologies include: the traditional “vested rights” 
approach; interest analysis; the better law approach; and the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Second Restatement) 
approach.62 In addition, some states put their own gloss on the 
methodologies or use a combined modern approach, in which various 
aspects of different methodologies are blended.63 Even categorizing 
states by methodologies poses difficulties for leading conflict-of-laws 
scholars.64 States also often apply different methodologies in tort and 
contract cases.65 While the traditional vested rights approach has been 
criticized for being too rigid, the modern choice-of-law approaches 
have been criticized for being too flexible.66 The danger of too much 
rigidity is a rule that requires application of state law that has an 
insignificant or fortuitous connection to the dispute, while too much 
flexibility results in inconsistent application of the choice-of-law 
                                                 
59 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: 
Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 232–33 & n.19 (2010) 
[hereinafter Symeonides, 2009 Survey]. 
60 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶¶ 1, 5, 310–11. 
61 Symeonides, 2009 Survey, supra note 59, at 231. 
62 Gardina, supra note 12, at 899–901. 
63SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶¶ 59, 61, 101. The combined modern approach is described as eclecticism. Id. ¶ 61. 
64 Id. ¶ 59 (“Classifying a state into a particular methodological camp is not an 
exact science. Difficulties arise from a variety of sources, ranging from the lack or 
dearth of authoritative precedent, to precedents that are either equivocal or 
exceedingly eclectic.”). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. ¶¶ 368–69. 
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rule.67 Choice-of-law scholars have noted that cases decided using a 
choice-of-law rule that is too flexible results in ad hoc decision-
making, which increases litigations costs and wastes judicial 
resources.68 Perhaps most importantly, too much flexibility increases 
the threat of judicial subjectivism, which challenges the public’s faith 
in and the legitimacy of the legal system.69 Most states have now 
abandoned the traditional approach, at least in one area of law, for one 
of the more flexible modern approaches,70 and thus are subject to 
some of the dangers that accompany choice-of-law approaches that ar
too flexib
e 
le. 
                                                
 
1. The Traditional Choice-of-Law Methodology 
 
The traditional approach to conflict of laws in the United States 
can be traced back to Ulrich Huber, a seventeenth-century Dutch 
scholar.71 Huber wrote an essay, published in 1689, using the term, 
“conflict of laws,” for the first time.72 The essay included three 
principles which introduced the notion of “comity” and provided the 
foundation for Justice Joseph Story’s later work.73 Huber’s principles 
are:  
 
(1) The laws of each state have force within its territory 
but not beyond;  
(2) These laws bind all those who are found within the 
territory, whether permanently or temporarily; and  
(3) Out of comity, foreign laws may be applied so that 
rights acquired under them can retain their force, 
 
67 Gardina, supra note 12, at 899–901. 
68 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶ 369. 
69 Id.  
70 Symeonides, 2009 Survey, supra note 59, at 231. 
71 DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (7th ed. 2006). 
72 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.5 at 14. 
73 Id. § 2.5 at 14–15. 
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provided that they do not prejudice the state’s powers 
or rights.74  
 
Huber’s territorialist principles and the notion of comity, defined as 
more than “mere courtesy,” but less than “a legal duty,” while 
imprecise, began to provide a framework for determining when a 
forum state will choose to apply a foreign state’s substantive laws.75  
The first two principles were dedicated to the idea of territoriality—
that a state’s laws were only effective within its territory and only 
bound its citizens or visitors within its borders.76  The third principle 
contained the comity doctrine, which was an attempt to reconcile the 
forum state’s sovereignty with the application of foreign law in a 
particular case.77 Although Huber’s principles were quoted in 
American cases beginning by at least the late 1800s, Justice Joseph 
Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, 
published in 1834, is credited as “the most important factor in the 
spread and acceptance of the comity doctrine.”78  
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, comity was often 
invoked by the courts, but it was criticized because of the inherent 
difficulties in reconciling territorialist principles with the notion of 
comity.79 To reconcile territoriality with comity, critics proposed the 
“vested rights” doctrine, which found the support of Professor Joseph 
Beale, who wrote the American Law Institute’s Restatement (First) of 
Conflict of Laws (First Restatement).80 Beale explained the doctrine 
of vested rights as follows: “‘A right having been created by th
appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow 
everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called into 
e 
                                                 
74 Id. For a translation of Huber’s essay, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De 
Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1919). 
75 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.5 at 14. 
76 Id. § 2.5 at 15. 
77 Id. § 2.7 at 20. 
78 Id. § 2.7 at 18. 
79 Id. § 2.7 at 20. 
80 Id. § 2.7 at 20–21; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
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question anywhere.’”81 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes embraced 
Beale’s “vested rights” theory in Slater v. Mexican National Railroad 
Co. in 1904,82 and the theory was incorporated into the provisions of 
the First Restatement.83 Beale’s approach, and thus the First 
Restatement’s approach, is considered the traditional approach to 
choice-of-law, and courts universally used Beale’s vested rights theory 
until the 1950s, when modern approaches to choice-of-law began to 
gain traction.84 
Under the vested rights theory, a right vests when an event occurs 
in a state.85 Different rules exist for various types of disputes, but a 
single contact determines which state’s choice-of-law rule applies in 
intrastate conflicts.86 In a tort case, the court applies the law of the 
state where the injury occurred.87 In a contract case, the court applies 
the law of the state where the contract was made.88 The choice-of-law 
rule applied for procedural disputes is the forum state’s law, and the 
rule applied for real property disputes is the law of the state where the 
property is located.89 The law of the selected jurisdiction is applied to 
all substantive issues.90  
                                                 
81 Id. § 2.7 at 21 (quoting JOSEPH H. BEALE, 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 517 (1901)). 
82 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 5 (citing Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co., 
194 U.S. 120 (1904)). 
83 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.7 at 21. 
84 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 5. 
85 WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND 
CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20 
(Jack Stark ed., Reference Guides to the U.S. Constitution, No. 15, 2005) (“The rules 
are ‘jurisdiction selecting,’ which means that they select the applicable law by first 
selecting a place or jurisdiction, and then applying the place’s substantive law 
rule.”).  
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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A number of “escape devices” are employed by courts seeking to 
avoid unfair outcomes that result from straightforward application of 
traditional choice-of-law rules.91 Escape devices are tools that allow a 
court to select a different law than would have been applied using one 
of the rigid choice-of-law rules under the traditional approach. 92 
Characterization, renvoi and the public policy exception are escape 
devices used by courts.93 If a dispute has both contract and tort issues, 
and deciding the case under the contract rule results in a harsh 
outcome, the court can re-characterize the contract case as a tort case 
to allow application of another state’s law.94 Courts can also 
characterize issues as procedural instead of substantive.95 Renvoi is a 
legal principle that, when applied, results in a perpetual loop where the 
forum court adopts the foreign state’s “whole” law, its substantive law, 
and choice-of-law rules, which then refer the court back to the 
substantive law of the forum.96 The forum court can refuse to consider 
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules and “reject” the renvoi or accept 
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules and “accept” the renvoi.97 If the 
court accepts the renvoi and the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules 
refer back to the forum state’s law, there is “remission.”98 If the 
foreign state’s choice-of-law rules refer to a third state’s substantive 
law, there is “transmission.”99 Another escape device is the public 
                                                 
91 Id. at 21. 
92 Id. (stating that “[escape devices] permit the court to manipulate among 
supposedly readily apparent choices in order to reach a desired result.”) 
93 Id. 
94 Id.; see Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc. 108 Conn. 333 
(1928) (characterizing an action to recover damages by a passenger in a rented car to 
be a contract action instead of a tort action, which allowed the passenger to recover 
damages from the rental company under Connecticut law).  
95 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22, 
¶ 40. 
96 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 64. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 65. 
99 Id. 
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policy exception, which was recognized in the First Restatement.100  
Section 612 states that “[n]o action can be maintained upon a cause of 
action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to 
the strong public policy of the forum.”101 Thus, if the court finds that 
the selected substantive law is repugnant to the public policy of the 
forum state, it can instead apply its own law.102 
The First Restatement’s choice-of-law system was criticized as 
being mechanical, rigid, and overly reliant on the principles of 
territorialism and vested rights. 103 The use of escape devices 
demonstrates that, in at least some cases, those criticisms were valid. 
The virtues that have been attributed to the traditional system—
predictability, simplicity, and forum neutrality—were negated by the 
use of escape devices.104 There was no attempt under the traditional 
approach to consider the purposes and policies behind the conflicting 
substantive laws, nor were the parties’ expectations taken into 
consideration. 105 Thus, the traditional approach resulted in application 
of the substantive law of a state that had a tenuous interest in the 
dispute, was unduly harsh, or defeated the parties’ expectations.106  
                                                 
100 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612. 
101 Id . 
102 In re Guevara, 409 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a Texas 
debtor’s $20,000 gambling debt owed to a Louisiana casino under a gambling 
“marker” was not an enforceable bankruptcy claim because gambling on credit was 
contrary to Texas public policy). 
103 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 9. 
104 REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 85, at 21. 
105 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 9.  (“[The traditional rules] completely sacrificed flexibility on the altar of 
certainty and, in the pursuit of an ill-conceived theoretical purity, they ignored the 
lessons of experience. They chose not among laws, but among states, based solely on 
a single, predesignated, territorial, or other factual contact. Subject only to limited 
post-choice exceptions, the chosen law applied almost automatically, regardless of 
its content, its underlying policy, or the substantive quality of the solution it would 
bring to the case at hand.”) 
106 REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 85, at 20. 
 324
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
Modern choice-of-law methodologies were developed in part to 
achieve sensible results without the need to resort to escape devices.107 
 
2. Modern Choice-of-Law Methodologies 
 
The development of the modern approaches has been called a 
“revolution” because the “intellectual movement . . . challenged and 
eventually demolished the foundations of the established American 
system of conflicts law.”108 Professor Brainerd Currie pioneered a 
comprehensive alternative approach to the vested rights theory in the 
1950s and 1960s.109  Currie’s approach is known as “interest 
analysis.”110 Under Currie’s methodology, generally the law of the 
forum state should be applied.111 However, if the parties argued for 
application of a foreign state’s law:  
 
[T]he court should first of all determine the 
governmental policy . . . that is expressed by the law of 
the forum. The court should then inquire whether the 
relationship of the forum state to the case at bar . . . is 
such as to bring the case within the scope of the state’s 
governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis 
for the assertion that the state has an interest in the 
application of its policy in this instance.112 
 
The court should then engage in the same analysis of the foreign 
state’s law and governmental policy and determine whether the 
                                                 
107 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 17.8 at 723–24. 
108 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 1. 
109 Id. ¶ 14. 
110 REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 85, at 22–23. 
111 BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental 
Interests and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
188, 188 (1963). 
112 Id. at 189. 
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foreign state has an interest in application of its law.113 Through this 
analysis of governmental interests, the court determines which state’s 
law should be applied.114 
There are three generally recognized categories of conflicts that 
result from interest analysis: a “true conflict,” where more than one 
state is interested in applying its law; a “false conflict,” where only 
one state is interested; or an “unprovided-for case,” where no state is 
interested.115 If a true conflict arose in an interested forum, Currie 
argued the law of the forum should be applied; however, in a 
disinterested forum, Currie advocated the dismissal of the case on 
forum non conveniens grounds or application of the forum’s law, if 
dismissal was impossible.116 If the conflict was false, Currie argued 
the law of the only interested state, usually the forum state, should be 
applied.117  Finally, under Currie’s approach for unprovided-for cases, 
the law of the forum is applied.118  
The main criticism and difficulty that plagues interest analysis is 
identifying the purpose behind a state’s law.119 Often, there are 
multiple and complex purposes and policies underlying a substantive 
law, and for practical reasons, a court’s analysis may stop after 
identifying only one purpose. Furthermore, Currie’s analysis most 
often results in application of the forum’s law, and thus, interest 
analysis is criticized as favoring the application of forum law.120 Thus, 
applying the forum state’s law to resolve true conflicts encourages 
forum shopping.121  
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 188–89. 
115 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 19. 
116 Id. ¶ 21 & n.60. 
117 Id. ¶ 20. 
118 Id. ¶ 22. 
119 Id. ¶ 22. 
120 Id. ¶ 23. 
121 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 181. 
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Some courts use a “moderate and restrained” approach or the 
principle of “comparative impairment” to address the forum-favoring 
approach of interest analysis in true conflicts. Using the moderate and 
restrained approach, a court dissolves a true conflict by finding a false 
conflict, so that only one state is interested in having its law 
applied.122  The court finds a false conflict by narrowly reading the 
law to find its purposes and finds those purposes inapplicable to the
case.
 
aw of 
hen applied.125 
                                                
123 The “comparative impairment” approach, proposed by 
Professor William F. Baxter, considers the interests of the forum state 
and foreign state in having their law applied and determines which 
state’s policies would be impaired more if subordinated.124 The l
the state whose interests would be most impaired is t
In the 1960s, Professor Robert A. Leflar weighed in on the 
choice-of-law revolution and outlined five considerations for courts to 
use in deciding conflicts cases.126 Those choice-influencing 
considerations are: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of 
interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial 
task; (4) advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; and (5) 
application of the “better rule of law.”127 Leflar stated that no priority 
among the considerations should be inferred from the chronological 
order of the list.128 However, he also stated that the better rule of law 
would be “more important in some types of cases than in others, 
 
122 Id. at 185. 
123 Judge Traynor used the moderate and restrained approach in Bernkrant v. 
Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), to find a false conflict, and he subordinated 
California’s interests because of the parties’ expectations that Nevada law would 
apply to an oral contract. Thus, the court determined that only Nevada had an 
interest in having its law applied. 
124 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶¶ 25–26. 
125 Id. ¶ 25. 
126 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 228–31. 
127
 ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 95 at 279 (4th ed. 
1986).  
128 Id. at § 95 at 278 
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almost controlling in some but irrelevant in others.”129 Leflar’s better 
law approach has been criticized for “becoming a euphemism for a 
[forum law] approach[] and . . . providing convenient cover for 
judicial subjectivism.”130 While commentators have suggested that 
application of the forum law usually results from the better law 
approach, two empirical studies, limited to tort cases, have found that 
the better law approach leads to application of the forum’s law no 
more often than the other modern approaches.131  
The Second Restatement approach was developed in the wake of 
the various methodologies that had been created because of the 
deficiencies that courts had found using the vested rights approach 
adopted in the First Restatement.132 The foundation of the Second 
Restatement approach is provided by the factors for choosing the 
applicable rule of law articulated in Section 6.133 Section 6 states that a 
court should follow its own state’s choice-of-law statute and, in the 
absence of a statute, consider the following factors: (1) the needs of 
the interstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of the 
forum; (3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular 
issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies 
underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability, and 
uniformity of result; and (7) ease in the determination and application 
of the law to be applied.134 Section 6 is incorporated by reference into 
the provisions that deal with specific issues such as contract and tort 
cases, and the general overriding principle is that the law of the state 
with the “most significant relationship” to the dispute and the parties, 
as determined under the factors listed in Section 6, should be 
                                                 
129 Id. at § 107 at 300. 
130 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 29. 
131 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 240, 241 n.4. 
132 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 32. 
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6. 
134 Id. 
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applied.135 In addition, the Second Restatement includes provisions 
that deal with specific issues and instructs courts on the type of 
contacts that are determinative in resolving state law conflicts.  For 
example, Section 188 states that courts determining the rights and 
duties of parties under a contract without an effective choice-of-law 
provision should take into account the following contacts: the place of 
contracting; the place of negotiation; the place of performance; the 
location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of 
the parties.136  
Despite the fact that the Second Restatement has been adopted by 
many courts, it has been criticized for providing a “laundry list” of 
factors for the courts to consider that results in flexible, open-ended 
analysis.137 Critics have also noted that courts following the Second 
Restatement simply come to their own conclusions on choice-of-law 
questions.138 The Second Restatement allows courts this flexibility 
with its “tentative near rules, nonrules that use[] a soft ‘most 
significant relationship’ connecting factor, as well as state ‘interests’ 
and ‘policies.’”139 The practical upshot is that the Second Restatement 
is viewed as a “mishmash” of the various choice-of-law 
methodologies, which allows judges not to be “bound by any hard and 
fast rules, which inevitably prompt[s] undesirable outcomes in 
interstate and international cases.”140  
 
                                                 
135 Id. §§ 145, 188. 
136 Id. § 188. 
137 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 206, 228. 
138 Juenger, supra note 22, at 405–06 (“In a way, [the Second Restatement] 
was a non-Restatement: by mixing together all manner of doctrinal currents, it 
simply furnished the courts with any number of plausible reasons to support 
whatever results they wished to reach. That, no doubt, is the principal reason why 
judges like it and academics detest it.”). 
139 CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 226–27; Juenger, supra note 22, at 405.  
140 Juenger, supra note 22, at 405. 
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II. APPLICATION OF CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
 
A. Origins of the Current Circuit Split 
 
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,141 the 
Supreme Court extended the holding of Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins142 to choice-of-law rules.  The Klaxon Court held that 
federal courts exercising jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of 
citizenship must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the 
federal court is located.143 However, the Supreme Court has never 
expressly extended the holding of Klaxon to federal question cases. 
Further muddying the waters is the Supreme Court’s dicta in Vanston 
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, which seems to suggest 
that a federal choice-of-law rule may make the most sense in 
bankruptcy cases, where there are often significant contacts in many 
states.144  As a result, there is a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
and confusion in the district and bankruptcy courts as to whether state 
or federal choice-of-law rules apply.145  
                                                 
141 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (stating that “[o]therwise, the accident of 
diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in 
coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side”). 
142 304 U.S. 64, 77–79 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court held that a federal 
court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state common law and declared 
that “[t]here is no federal general common law.” Id. at 78. In doing so, the Court 
overruled Swift v. Tyson, under which federal courts sitting in diversity had been able 
to ignore the declarations of the state’s highest court and instead use their own 
judgment to determine what a state’s common law was. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
143 313 U.S. at 496. 
144 329 U.S. 156, 161–62 (1946), reh’g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947). 
145 Compare In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 358 (3d Cir. 
2007) (concluding state choice-of-law rules apply in bankruptcy cases), In re Gaston 
& Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that bankruptcy courts should apply 
the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in the absence of a significant federal 
interest), In re Payless Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
bankruptcy court applies the forum state’s choice-of-law rules), and In re Merritt 
Dredging Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that in the absence of a 
compelling federal interest, the court should apply the forum state’s choice-of-law 
rule to determine a debtor’s property interest in the property of the estate), with In re 
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A few years after Klaxon, in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp., the Supreme Court declined to determine 
whether Klaxon applies when jurisdiction is based on a federal 
question.146 In Justice Jackson’s concurrence in D’Oench, he noted 
that Erie had not been extended to federal question cases and also 
stated that he “[did] not understand Justice Brandeis’s statement in 
Erie . . . that ‘[t]here is no federal general common law,’ to deny that 
the common law may in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of, 
decision of federal questions.”147 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme 
Court declined to decide whether Klaxon applied to federal question 
cases in Vanston, a bankruptcy case.148 However, the Supreme Court 
decided not to apply state law to uphold an interest on interest 
bankruptcy claim on the basis of “the equitable principles governing 
bankruptcy distributions.”149 In addition, the Court stated that:  
 
[O]bligations, such as the one here for interest, often 
have significant contacts in many states, so that the 
question of which particular state’s law should measure 
the obligation seldom lends itself to simple solution. In 
determining which contact is the most significant in a 
particular transaction, courts can seldom find a 
complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the 
conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise of 
an informed judgment in the balancing of all the 
                                                                                                                   
Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that federal choice-
of-law rules must be applied in bankruptcy cases), In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that federal choice-of-law rules should be applied in bankruptcy 
cases), In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (applying an independent, 
federal choice-of-law rule in a legal malpractice action filed by the Chapter 7 trustee 
on behalf of the bankruptcy estate), and In re Cyrus II P’ship, 413 B.R. 609 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that federal choice-of-law rules should apply to 
fraudulent conveyance claims in bankruptcy). 
146 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942), reh’g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942). 
147 Id. at 467, 469–70 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
148 329 U.S. at 162–63. 
149 Id. at 163. 
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interests of the states with the most significant contacts 
in order best to accommodate the equities among the 
parties to the policies of those states.150 
 
This dicta has intrigued the courts and has been interpreted to 
indicate support for a federal common law choice-of-law rule in 
bankruptcy cases.151 
 
B. The Circuit Split 
 
The Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of whether 
state conflict-of-law rules should apply in federal question cases since 
Vanston was decided, and as a result, the federal courts have splintered 
into three groups. The First and Ninth Circuits, a bankruptcy court 
within the Fifth Circuit, and a district court within the Sixth Circuit 
have concluded that federal common law choice-of-law rules apply in 
federal question cases.152 Courts applying a federal common law 
choice-of-law rule for bankruptcy cases use the Second Restatement’s 
approach.153 The Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have determined 
that state choice-of-law rules apply.154 The Second and Fourth Circuits 
                                                 
150 Id. at 161-62. 
151 In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 90 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (stating that “several 
courts have taken these statements as strong evidence of how the [Supreme] Court 
would rule on the conflicts question if unavoidably confronted with it.”) 
152 In re Vortex Fishing Sys, 277 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (bankruptcy 
case); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 25–
26 (1st Cir. 2000) (Railway Labor Act);  In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 
1995) (bankruptcy case); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Edelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
861 F.2d 1291, 1294 (1st Cir. 1988) (Edge Act); In re Cyrus II P’ship, 413 B.R. 609, 
613–14 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (bankruptcy case); In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 
89–91 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (bankruptcy case).  
153 Gardina, supra note 12, at 910. 
154 See In re Teleglobe Commc’n, 493 F.3d 345, 358 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(bankruptcy case); In re Payless Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(bankruptcy case); FDIC v. Nordbrock, 102 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(FIRREA); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1464–65 
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have concluded that the forum state’s choice-of-law rules should apply 
in the absence of a compelling federal interest.155 However, some of 
the federal courts cannot be clearly placed in one group. The Fifth 
Circuit has declined to decide the issue twice156 but has stated that 
“[w]hen disposition of a federal question requires reference to state 
law, federal courts are not bound by the forum state’s choice-of-law 
rules, but are free to apply the law considered relevant to the pending 
controversy.”157 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has taken 
inconsistent positions in federal question cases. The confusion has led 
one bankruptcy court to decline to adopt a particular approach and 
instead analyze the choice-of-law question under all three 
approaches.158 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach in Bankruptcy and Other Federal 
Question Cases 
 
The Seventh Circuit has applied state choice-of-law rules in 
bankruptcy cases.159 In In re Iowa Railroad Co., the Seventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                   
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edge Act); Carlson v. Tandy Computer Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 
393 (8th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy). 
155 See In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606–07 (bankruptcy); In re Merritt 
Dredging Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (bankruptcy); but see Detroit Edison Co. v. 
Pac. Ins. Co., 742 F. Supp. 287, 289 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (concluding that a federal 
common law choice-of-law rule should be applied in a federal question case under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act), 
aff’d , 944 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1991). 
156 Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 
F.2d 744, 748–49 (5th Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 396 
(5th Cir. 1955). 
157 In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1229 (5th Cir. 1980) (bankruptcy case). 
158 In re Friedlander Capital Mgmt. Corp., 411 B.R. 434, 441–43 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2009) (“Because the result is the same under the three approaches discussed 
below, the Court declines to adopt a particular approach in this case.”). 
159 See In re Jafari, 569 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 
1077 (2010) (concluding that the court need not answer the choice-of-law question 
because the application of the federal common law approach produced the same 
result as the application of Wisconsin choice-of-law principles); Fogel v. Zell, 221 
F.3d 955, 966 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying a state choice-of-law rule but noting the 
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simply followed the holding of Klaxon and applied Illinois choice-of-
law rules because the court sits in Chicago, Illinois.160 The court 
acknowledged the circuit split in In re Morris but applied Illinois 
choice-of-law rules, which dictated the use of Iowa substantive law.161 
In Fogel v. Zell, the court noted the split and then applied Illinois 
choice-of-law rules.162 However, in other federal question cases, the 
court has applied federal choice-of-law principles.163 
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, the Resolution Trust 
Corporation brought a negligence action against the former directors 
and officers of a federally chartered savings and loan under a federal 
law, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).164 The court explicitly stated that the choice-
of-law question was a federal one in Chapman, a non-diversity 
case.165 Although Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. later 
overruled the primary holding of Chapman, the Seventh Circuit has 
stated that “[t]he ruling on choice-of-law, however, presumably 
                                                                                                                   
persistent circuit split); In re Morris, 30 F.3d 1578, 1582 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing the circuit split but declining to resolve it because both the forum 
state’s choice-of-law rules and the federal common law choice-of-law rule came to 
the same conclusion); In re Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 543 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(applying a state choice-of-law rule in a bankruptcy case and stating that “federal 
courts refer to the ‘whole law’ of the forum state” ). 
160 840 F.2d at 542–43. 
161 30 F.3d at 1582. In re Morris illustrates how characterization can determine 
the outcome of a case. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the issue was the validity 
or effect of conveyance of real estate; however, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
bankruptcy and district courts that the relevant issue was the corporation’s existence 
and legal capacity. Id. If the Illinois choice-of-law rule for resolving questions about 
the validity or effect of a conveyance had been applied, Illinois substantive law 
would have been selected since the land in question was located in Illinois. Id. 
162 221 F.3d at 966. 
163 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994), reh’g en 
banc denied (7th Cir. 1994), overruled by Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 
U.S. 213 (1997); Berger v. AXA Network LLC, 459 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006). 
164 29 F.3d at 1124. 
165 Id. 
 334
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
remains controlling precedent.”166 Most recently in 2006, the court 
applied a federal choice-of-law rule in Berger v. AXA Network LLC
case where the underlying claim was based on the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
, a 
 
ould 
d 
 stated that: 
                                                
167 The parties in Berger 
disagreed as to whether Illinois or New York law supplied the 
applicable statute of limitations period for the action where one was
not provided in the applicable ERISA provision.168 In discussing the 
choice-of-law issue, the court stated “[w]hat law Illinois courts w
choose is . . . irrelevant. This is not a diversity case, where Erie woul
require the forum court to apply the whole law of the state, including 
its choice of law principles.”169 Additionally, the court
 
In fashioning a choice of law rule to govern our quest 
for the most appropriate state limitations period, our 
task, when the underlying claim is a federal claim, is to 
fashion a federal choice of law rule. This principle is 
really nothing more than a corollary principle to the 
more general maxim that, when state law is borrowed 
in a federal question suit, the choice of ‘which [state] 
law to select is itself a question of federal law.’170  
 
 
166 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wabick, 335 F.3d 620, 625 n.2 (7th Cir. 2003). 
In Wabick, a case brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
under FIRREA, the court was faced with the question of whether the federal statute 
or Illinois’ substantive law provided the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 622, 
626. The district court, using federal common law choice-of-law rules, determined 
that Washington, D.C.’s statute of limitations applied. Id. at 624. The Seventh 
Circuit reversed because it found that the question was resolved by the statute itself, 
which directed the court to apply the forum state’s choice-of-law principles. Id. at 
627–28. The Court recognized that by applying state choice-of-law rules in Wabick, 
it was taking a different position than the one it had taken in Resolution Trust Corp. 
Id. at 625. 
167 459 F.3d at 805, 809–10. 
168 Id. at 809. 
169 Id. at 810. 
170 Id. at 809–10 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 
1124 (7th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original). 
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The court went on to reason that “the exercise of federal question 
jurisdiction does not implicate concerns of federalism and interstate 
comity.”171 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has stated that application of 
federal choice-of-law principles is appropriate in cases where the court 
is exercising federal question jurisdiction. It is unclear why the court’s 
strong endorsement of federal choice-of-law rules in some federal 
question cases has not extended to bankruptcy cases. 
 
D. In re Jafari 
 
The Seventh Circuit recently had an opportunity to decide 
whether state choice-of-law rules or a federal common law choice-of-
law rule applies in bankruptcy in In re Jafari.172 Unfortunately, the 
court did little more than provide an outline of the circuit split that 
presently exists.173 In Jafari, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
conclusion of the bankruptcy court that Wisconsin choice-of-law rules 
applied and that under Wisconsin’s “grouping of contacts” rule for 
contractual disputes, Nevada law applied to the claims of the 
creditors.174 As a result, the creditors’ claims were allowed under 
Nevada law.175 
The debtor, Robert Jafari, was a gambling addict whose gambling 
debts ultimately cost him his job and led to his filing a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition.176 Despite being bailed out of roughly $3,000,000 
in gambling debts by his father before 2005, Jafari continued to 
gamble.177 In 2005, Jafari, a Wisconsin resident, traveled to Las 
Vegas, Nevada, to gamble, and a credit line was approved for Jafari by 
                                                 
171 Id. at 810. 
172 In re Jafari, 569 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1077 
(2010). 
173 Id. at 648–49. 
174 Id. at 649–51. 
175 Id. at 651. 
176 In re Jafari (Jafari III), 378 B.R. 575, 578–79 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2007), 
rev’d, In re Jafari (Jafari II) 385 B.R. 262 (W.D. Wisc. 2008), aff’d, In re Jafari, 569 
F.3d 644. 
177 In re Jafari, 569 F.3d at 646. 
 336
28
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
casino developer Steve Wynn for use at his casino.178 Jafari made trips 
to Las Vegas to gamble at the Wynn and other casinos numerous times 
in 2005.179 In September 2005, Jafari executed with the Wynn a new 
credit agreement, also known as a “marker,” with an initial line of 
credit of $150,000, then executed subsequent credit line increase 
requests, bringing his total line of credit to $1,000,000.180 
During September 2005, another Las Vegas casino, Caesar’s, also 
extended credit totaling $250,000 to Jafari.181 Jafari failed to repay the 
credit advance, so Wynn and Caesar’s presented their markers for 
payment against his bank account.182 Payment was denied, so both 
Wynn and Caesar’s filed suit against Jafari in Nevada district court.183 
Two days before his answer was due in the Nevada case, Jafari and his 
wife filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in Wisconsin, which 
stayed the Nevada lawsuit.184 Wynn and Caesar’s then filed timely 
proofs of claim in the bankruptcy court, to which the Jafaris and the 
bankruptcy trustee objected.185 Wynn’s proof of claim was for over 
$1.2 million, and Caesar’s was for $250,000.186 The Jafaris and the 
bankruptcy trustee argued that under the Wisconsin Anti-Gaming 
Statute, the gambling debts could not be enforced.187 Thus, the 
bankruptcy court had to decide whether to allow or disallow the 
casinos’ claims.188 Concluding that it was required to apply 
Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules instead of federal common law 
choice-of-law rules, the bankruptcy court disallowed the claims 
because it determined that the claims for gambling debts were 
                                                 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 646–47. 
186 Id. at 646. 
187 Id. at 647. 
188 Id. 
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unenforceable under Wisconsin’s Anti-Gaming Statute, which states 
that gaming contracts are void.189 Wynn and Caesar’s appealed to the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, which 
reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding and declined to decide 
whether Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules or the federal common law 
choice-of-law rules applied.190 The district court determined that 
Nevada substantive law would apply to determine if the credit 
agreements were enforceable under either Wisconsin choice-of-law 
rules or the federal common law choice-of-law rules.191 Upon remand, 
the bankruptcy court applied Nevada law and determined that the 
claims were allowable.192 
On appeal, Jafari argued that the forum state’s choice-of-law rules 
should be applied in the absence of a compelling federal policy or 
interest.193 Applying Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rule, Jafari argued, 
would result in Wisconsin substantive law applying and the casino’s 
claims being disallowed due to Wisconsin’s strong public policy 
interest in applying its anti-gambling statute.194 The casinos argued 
that because of the need for uniformity in bankruptcy case 
administration, the bankruptcy court must apply federal common law 
choice-of-law rules.195 Under their analysis, the casinos stated that 
Nevada law would apply.196 In the alternative, the casinos argued that 
even if the bankruptcy court was required to apply Wisconsin’s 
choice-of-law rules, Nevada law would be selected because of Jafari’s 
numerous contacts with Nevada.197   
The Seventh Circuit determined that if the same outcome would 
result under application of either Wisconsin choice-of-law principles 
                                                 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 647–48. 
195 Id. at 648. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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or the federal common law choice-of-law approach, there was no need 
for the court to resolve the question as to which choice-of-law rules 
should be applied in bankruptcy cases.198 The court then applied 
Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rule for contracts and determined that the 
significant contacts in the Jafari case favored the selection of Nevada 
law.199 The court further determined that a Wisconsin court would not 
have applied the public policy exception.200 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Policy Concerns in Bankruptcy 
 
The outcome of the Jafari case is unremarkable. Using most 
choice-of-law methodologies, the facts in Jafari would have led to the 
application of Nevada law. In addition, the credit agreements that 
Jafari had signed with the casinos contained statements that Nevada 
law would apply in the case of a dispute, although the Seventh Circuit 
did not address this fact.201 The court was able to avoid making a 
difficult decision on the choice-of-law issue because Nevada law was 
selected by applying either Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules or the 
federal choice-of-law principles. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit 
did not meaningfully address the circuit split, why it has chosen to 
apply federal choice-of-law rules in other federal question cases, or the 
policy concerns, such as uniformity, that are unique to bankruptcy. 
As the Jafari district court opinion noted, “a federal bankruptcy 
court is in an unusual position. Its jurisdiction arises not from 
diversity, but from federal bankruptcy law, which has a goal of 
national uniformity, rather than congruence with state law.”202 As 
discussed in Part I.A., Congress was empowered to enact uniform 
                                                 
198 Id. at 649. 
199 Id. at 650. 
200 Id. at 650–51. 
201 Jafari II, 385 B.R. 262, 265 (W.D. Wisc. 2008), aff’d, 569 F.3d 644, cert. 
denied, 130 S.Ct. 1077 (2010). 
202 Id. at 266. 
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bankruptcy laws under the Bankruptcy Clause, and as Madison wrote 
in The Federalist No. 42, uniform bankruptcy laws were necessary to 
deal with the problems that would arise in bankruptcy cases where the 
debtor and creditors were from different states.  
Courts are faced with the “special bankruptcy problems of 
uniformity, ratable distribution and fairness and equity which grow out 
of the context of the bankruptcy law.”203 However, application of 
various state choice-of-law rules yields inconsistent results, which are 
at odds with the goal of uniformity in bankruptcy. In addition, state 
choice-of law rules, which favor the forum, can result in selection of 
substantive law with a tenuous connection to the dispute and parties. 
Finally, liberal bankruptcy venue rules and favorable state law invites 
interstate forum shopping.  
 
1. Substantive Law with a Tenuous Connection to the Dispute and 
Parties 
 
Application of state choice-of-law rules in bankruptcy can result 
in selection of the substantive law of a state that has little or no 
connection with the dispute. In re Gaston & Snow, a case often cited 
for its discussion of the circuit split over choice-of-law rules in 
bankruptcy cases, is an example of a case where the law of New York, 
which had almost no connection to the dispute, was selected by 
application of New York’s choice-of-law rules.204 Gaston & Snow (G 
& S) was a law firm that had gone into bankruptcy.205 G & S’s 
bankruptcy estate administrator filed an adversary proceeding in New 
York against a client, Robert Erkins, to recover $1.7 million for legal 
services that had allegedly been performed for Erkins.206 Erkins, an 
Idaho businessman, had hired G & S, a Boston, Massachusetts, firm, 
                                                 
203 Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 n.9 
(1946), reh’g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947). 
204 In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 605–07 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
543 U.S. 1042 (2001). 
205 Id. at 602. An involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition had been filed 
against G & S, so the firm did not engage in forum shopping in this case. 
206 Id. at 602-03. 
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to represent him in litigation in Idaho based on an oral agreement, the 
terms of which were in dispute.207 G & S had a satellite office in New 
York, but its Boston-based attorneys represented Erkins.208 
Application of Idaho’s statute of limitations period of four years would 
have barred the oral contract claim, whereas the claim would have 
been valid under application of the New York six-year statute of 
limitations period.209 The Second Circuit applied New York’s choice-
of-law rule for contract cases, which requires selecting the state that 
has the greatest interest in the case by determining which jurisdiction 
has the most contacts with the litigation.210 The court acknowledged 
that “New York’s relationship to the action is insignificant compared 
to Idaho’s.”211 None of the business transacted between Erkins and G 
& S occurred in New York.212 However, New York also had a 
borrowing statute, which required application of the New York statute 
of limitations period when “‘the cause of action accrued in favor of a 
resident of the state.’”213 Thus, the court found that New York’s 
statute of limitations applied.214 The court acknowledged the 
defendant’s argument that the cause of action did not accrue in favor 
of the bankruptcy administrator, a New York resident, and that G & S 
was not a New York resident; however, the defendants did not raise 
that argument below, and the court declined to consider the argument 
on appeal.215 Gaston is a clear example of the forum-favoring nature 
                                                 
207 Id. at 602. 
208 Id. at 602–03. 
209 Id. at 604. 
210 Id. at 607–08. 
211 Id. at 605. 
212 Id. at 602. 
213 Id. at 604 (citing N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 202 (1993)). 
214 Id. at 608–09. 
215 Id. at 608. The court also stated that the defendant’s argument was “quite 
dubious,” and under New York law, “[a] nonresident’s contract claim accrues where 
the nonresident resides.” Id. at 608 n.7. Further, the court stated that G & S’s 
residence was Massachusetts, under which a six-year statute of limitations would 
have been applied. Id. 608 n.3. 
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of some choice-of-law rules and how the law of a state with little 
connection to the dispute may nevertheless be selected. 
 
2. Interstate Forum Shopping 
 
Intrastate forum shopping between federal and state courts, the 
very evil that the Supreme Court was trying to prevent by requiring 
federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state choice-of-law rules,216 
is not the issue in bankruptcy cases. As the Ninth Circuit stated, “[i]n 
[federal question] cases, the risk of forum shopping which is avoided 
by applying state law has no application, because the case can only be 
litigated in federal court. The value of national uniformity of approach 
need not be subordinated, therefore, to differences in state choice of 
law rules.”217 By contrast, application of state choice-of-law rules 
invites interstate forum shopping. In fact, overruling Klaxon has been 
advocated for several reasons, including the fact that Klaxon 
encourages interstate forum shopping under the current system in 
which states provide a variety of choice-of-law approaches.218  
                                                 
216 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The goal of Erie and Klaxon . . . was to prevent “forum shopping” as 
between state and federal systems . . . .”) 
217 In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1995). 
218 See Fruehwald, supra note 3, at 36–39. Fruehwald argues that Klaxon 
should be overruled:  
 
Although this article proposes Erie is constitutionally required and 
necessary for practical reasons, the same does not apply to Klaxon. 
First, Klaxon was a poorly-reasoned decision that is supported on a 
single ground—the dangers of intrastate forum shopping. Second, 
because of the numerous state choice of law approaches that exist 
today, Klaxon encourages interstate forum shopping for favorable 
law. Third, Klaxon ignores the fact that choice of law is a 
multistate process that should not be restricted by parochial state 
conflicts rules. Fourth, Klaxon often encourages, rather than 
discourages, intrastate forum shopping. Finally, Klaxon produces 
absurd results in some cases.  
 
Id. at 36. 
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In his dissenting opinion in Ferens v. John Deere Co., Justice 
Scalia wrote that forum shopping was invited not only by more 
generous statute of limitations available under various state laws, but 
also by the variety of state choice-of-law rules.219 In Ferens, the 
Supreme Court held that following a transfer under 28 U.S. § 1404(a) 
initiated by the plaintiff, the transferee court must apply the choice-of-
law rules applied in the transferor court.220 This holding allowed the 
plaintiff, who had failed to file suit in Pennsylvania federal court 
before the Pennsylvania tort statute of limitations period ran, to file a 
tort action in Mississippi federal court and then have the suit 
transferred back to Pennsylvania along with the more generous six-
year statute of limitations period required under Mississippi’s choice-
of-law rules.221 Ferens, although not a bankruptcy case, is an example 
of forum shopping at its zenith.222 In addition, it shows that Klaxon 
encourages forum shopping by requiring federal courts to apply state 
choice-of-law rules.223 
While the Bankruptcy Code does have some provisions that 
discourage forum shopping by limiting where a debtor may file for 
bankruptcy, there is some flexibility to those limitations, especially for 
business debtors. For example, under Chapter 11, an individual may 
file in the district where she or he resides.224 However, if an individual 
debtor wants to take advantage of a state’s exemption scheme, which 
                                                 
219 Ferens, 494 U.S. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he file-and-transfer 
ploy sanctioned by the Court today will be available . . . to bring home to the desired 
state of litigation all sorts of favorable choice-of-law rules regarding substantive 
liability—in an era when the diversity among the States in choice-of-law principles 
has become kaleidoscopic.” Id. Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 533. 
220 Id. at 518–19. 
221 Id. at 519–20. 
222 Id. at 535–36 (“The plaintiffs were seeking to achieve exactly what Klaxon 
was designed to prevent: the use of a Pennsylvania federal court instead of a 
Pennsylvania state court in order to obtain application of a different substantive law. 
. . . The significant federal judicial policy expressed in Erie and Klaxon is reduced to 
a laughingstock if it can so readily be evaded through filing-and-transfer.”).  
223 Fruehwald, supra note 3, at 43. 
224 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006). 
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determines the property that is exempted from the bankruptcy estate, 
the debtor must have been domiciled in that state for the 730 days 
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition.225 If the debtor has not 
lived in a single place for that period of time, then the law of the state 
where the debtor lived for the 180 days before filing bankruptcy 
supplies the state exemption option.226 Business debtors, on the other 
hand, have a variety of venue options. They may file in the state where 
the business is incorporated, in the state where its principle place of 
business is located, in the state where its assets are located, or in the 
state where its affiliate, general partner, or partnership’s bankruptcy is 
pending.227 These options provide business debtors with considerable 
flexibility in choosing where to file bankruptcy, and in a significant 
percentage of large Chapter 11 cases, Delaware and New York are the 
jurisdictions most often selected.228 One example of forum shopping 
that occurred under the flexible options offered to corporate debtors 
was Winn-Dixie’s bankruptcy.229 Winn-Dixie, a Florida-based grocery 
chain, incorporated a New York subsidiary, saddled it with debt, and 
then had the subsidiary file for bankruptcy twelve days later.230 This 
allowed the parent company to file for bankruptcy in New York 
                                                 
225 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). 
226 Id. 
227 28 U.S.C. § 1408. 
228 See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, Points of View; Commentary 
and Analysis, Courting the Big Bankrupts, LEGAL TIMES, July 18, 2005, at 58. 
[hereinafter LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts]. LoPucki’s empirical analysis and 
anecdotal evidence have focused on forum shopping, the competition by courts and 
judges for large Chapter 11 cases, and the negative effects on the bankruptcy system. 
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra, at 967–72. However, not all scholars agree that forum 
shopping is bad, and they have criticized LoPucki’s analysis for failing to distinguish 
between good and bad forum shopping. Todd J. Zywicki, Review Essay, Is Forum 
Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1143 
(2006). 
229 LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts, supra note 228, at 59.  
230 Id. 
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shortly thereafter because its affiliate’s bankruptcy was pending in the 
state.231  
Bankruptcy courts have recognized the opportunity for forum 
shopping and have applied a federal choice-of-law rule to ensure that 
forum shopping is not used to manipulate the claims allowance 
process.232 In In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., the debtor objected to a 
proof of claim filed by a creditor based on alleged fraudulent 
representations made by the debtor about a sculpture attributed to 
Alexander Calder.233 The debtor argued that the creditor’s claim was 
not enforceable because Connecticut’s statute of limitations for tort 
actions had run.234 The court applied a federal common law choice-of-
law rule and found that New York, where most of the relevant acts 
took place, had the greatest interest in the case.235 The court explained 
that: 
 
It is fundamentally unfair, and subversive of 
uniformity, for a debtor to be permitted to defeat a 
creditor’s claim—which was timely prosecuted in, and 
under the law of, the state with the greatest interest in 
the dispute—through the simple maneuver of filing a 
bankruptcy case in a different state where a less 
generous statute of limitation arguably controls. 
Allowance of claims against a bankruptcy estate should 
not depend upon the happenstance or devise of 
bankruptcy venue. To rule otherwise would encourage 
forum-shopping by debtors who may contemplate 
moving a residence, or restructuring business 
operations to permit a bankruptcy filing in a state with 
                                                 
231 Id. 
232 In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., 258 B.R. 547, 551–52 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
2001). 
233 Id. at 549–50. 
234 Id. at 550–51. 
235 Id. at 551. 
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an expired limitations period as to material claims 
against them.236 
 
Thus, an opportunity for forum shopping exists, and debtors may 
engage in forum shopping to take advantage of courts237 or state 
substantive law, such as a statute of limitations, that is considered 
desirable.238 The ability to forum shop under Chapter 11’s venue 
provision has been recognized, and efforts at reform have been 
supported by bankruptcy experts, members of Congress, the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission, state attorneys general, and 
consumer, employee, and small business interest groups.239 However, 
Congressional efforts to amend the provision have been 
unsuccessful.240 Creating federal choice-of-law rules that do not favor 
                                                 
236 Id. at 552. 
237 LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts, supra note 228, at 58.  
238 In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., 258 B.R. 547, 550–51. 
239 John Cornyn, Points of View; Commentary and Analysis, They Owe Us: 
Companies Seeking Bankruptcy Relief Should Face Creditors in Their Home Court, 
LEGAL TIMES, June 6, 2005, at 67. 
240 In response to corporate Chapter 11 forum shopping, Texas Senator John 
Cornyn introduced a bill, the Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act of 2005, to 
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1408, the Bankruptcy Code’s venue provision for Chapter 11 
cases in 2005. Cornyn, supra note 239. Senator Cornyn cited the filing of Houston-
based Enron’s bankruptcy claim in New York in 2001 as an example of corporate 
bankruptcy forum shopping. Id. As Attorney General of Texas, Cornyn had argued 
that Enron should have faced its creditors and filed for bankruptcy in Texas. Id. The 
bill would have amended the venue provision to limit the jurisdictions available to 
corporate debtors that were filing bankruptcy. Id. The proposed reforms were based 
on a major recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, and 
the legislation was supported by leading bankruptcy experts, a bipartisan coalition of 
twenty-four state attorneys general, as well as groups representing consumer, 
employee, and small business interests. Id. Senator Cornyn attempted to attach his 
bill as an amendment to BAPCPA, the bankruptcy overhaul bill that was enacted in 
2005. Gebe Martinez, Bankruptcy Bill Losing Enron Link: Cornyn Taking Out 
Measure on ‘Judge Shopping’, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, March 3, 2005, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/05/legislature/3065576.html. 
However, faced with the strong opposition of then-Senator and now-Vice President 
Joseph Biden, and his fellow Delaware Senator Thomas Carper, who were concerned 
about potential revenue losses to their state, Senator Cornyn was forced to drop the 
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a particular forum could prevent forum shopping and would likely be 
less controversial than trying to amend the Chapter 11 venue 
provisions, under which some states have benefitted.241 
 
B. Relevant Constitutional Provisions 
 
Five constitutional provisions have been identified that have 
varying levels of relevance in conflict of laws and provide 
constitutional limits on state authority or require cooperation by the 
states. 242 Those provisions include: the Full Faith and Credit Clause; 
the Due Process Clause; the Equal Protection Clause; the Commerce 
Clause; and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.243 In choice-of-law 
cases, the Supreme Court has discussed both the Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses.244 In the context of bankruptcy and choice-
of-law, three clauses—the Bankruptcy Clause, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause—are all relevant 
to the discussion of Congress’ power to enact choice-of-law rules.245  
                                                                                                                   
amendment. Id. The Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act of 2005 was never voted 
out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. 314, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
241 See supra note 240. 
242 LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS § 3.1, at 112, 128 (1991). 
243 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; BRILMAYER, supra note 240, § 3.1, at 
112. 
244 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (due process); Bradford 
Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (full faith and credit); Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) (due 
process); Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) 
(full faith and credit); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 
493 (1939) (full faith and credit); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) 
(due process and full faith and credit); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797 (1985) (due process and full faith and credit); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 
717 (1988) (due process and full faith and credit); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 
U.S. 488 (2003) (full faith and credit). 
245 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1.  
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The Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to enact bankruptcy 
laws,246 and the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the 
power to enact laws to execute its enumerated powers,247 which 
include the Bankruptcy Clause. Furthermore, Congress has the ability 
to establish lower federal courts under Articles I and III of the 
Constitution.248 It follows that Congress has the power to create 
bankruptcy courts, the bankruptcy laws, and the rules of procedures 
used by the courts.249 Thus, Congress has the power to enact federal 
choice-of-law rules as part of its ability to establish the bankruptcy 
court’s rules pursuant to its power under the Bankruptcy Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause.250 
Another legislative avenue for Congress, and the more direct 
grant of power vis-à-vis choice-of-law, is the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.251 Congress has the power to legislate choice-of-law rules 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which provides that “Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”252 How to apply 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to each state’s public acts is the 
portion of the clause relevant to choice-of-law issues.  
The debate on the Full Faith and Credit Clause at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was limited, but the comments of 
those moving for action on the clause provide some insight into its 
purpose.253 On the day that the most extensive debate on the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause took place, the Bankruptcy Clause was also 
discussed, and bankruptcy was discussed as part of the need for the 
                                                 
246 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
247 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
248 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
249 See Cross, supra note 8, at 561; Gardina, supra note 12, at 925. 
250 Id. 
251 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
252 See id. 
253 Jackson, supra note 1, at 4.  
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Full Faith and Credit Clause. 254 The records from August 29, 1787, 
note that, “Mr. Wilson & Docr. Johnson supposed the meaning to be 
that Judgments in one State should be ground of actions in other 
States, & that acts of the Legislatures should be included, for the sake 
of Acts of insolvency &c.”255 It is interesting that members of the 
Constitutional Convention believed that there was a connection 
between bankruptcy and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.256 Although 
the clause was discussed later in the Constitutional Convention, the 
final form of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is substantially similar to 
the version of the clause that resulted from the debates on that day.257  
Most importantly, the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause grants Congress the power to enact laws that determine how 
full faith and credit shall be given to each state’s public acts, records 
and judicial proceedings.258 However, the early Congresses used their 
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause very sparingly,259 and 
the more modern Congresses have also been reluctant to use their 
power.260 As a result, the courts have been left to determine how to 
apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause.261 
                                                 
254 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 447 (Max Farrand 
ed. 1911). The next comment that was recorded, in the middle of the discussion 
surrounding the Full Faith and Credit Clause, was a motion to commit to the 
Bankruptcy Clause. Id. The comments then returned to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Id. at 447–48. As originally proposed, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
provided no power to Congress. Jackson, supra note 1, at 4–5. The debate reflects 
that James Madison wanted Congress to have the power “to provide for the 
execution of Judgments in other States”; however this drew opposition from Mr. 
Randolph. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 448. Gouverneur 
Morris then moved to commit to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and his motion 
was adopted: “[T]he Legislature shall by general laws, determine the proof and 
effect of such acts, records and proceedings.” Id. 
255 Id. at 447.  
256 See id. 
257 Jackson, supra note 1, at 5. 
258 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
259 Jackson, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
260 See SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra 
note 22 ¶ 4 n. 11(citing two statutes that Congress has passed, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, 
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C. Institutional Considerations 
 
Institutional considerations are significant in determining whether 
the Supreme Court or Congress should create choice-of-law rules. The 
Supreme Court has almost completely withdrawn from the discussion 
over choice-of-law and the Full Faith and Credit Clause,262 and its 
recent dicta has provided little guidance to the bar or the lower courts.  
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, the Court stated that: 
 
[O]ur precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws 
(legislative measures and common law) and to 
judgments . . . Whereas the full faith and credit 
command is exacting with respect to [a] final judgment 
. . . rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over 
the subject matter and persons governed by the 
judgment, . . . it is less demanding with respect to 
choice of laws.263  
 
In its earlier Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, the Court had 
attempted to apply a balancing approach to resolving conflicts 
between state laws.264 However, the Court found the balancing 
approach unsatisfactory and subsequently abandoned that approach for 
resolving conflicts of law.265  
                                                                                                                   
the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, the 
“Defense of Marriage Act.”) 
261 Jackson, supra note 1, at 6. 
262 Douglas A. Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992). 
263 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003) (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 
222, 232–33 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted).  
264 Id. at 495 (citing Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 
(1932)). 
265 Id. at 495–96. 
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As a result, the Court’s Full Faith and Credit analysis has been 
collapsed into Due Process analysis in the choice-of-law context.266 
Justice Stevens believes that the analysis of the two clauses are 
separate inquiries because the “provisions protect different 
interests.”267 The Due Process Clause, which provides that no “State 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law,” protects individual rights, while the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, which provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State,” is designed to protect the interstate 
system.268 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court in Hyatt, 
acknowledged that the Court had been previously unsuccessful in 
finding an approach to resolve state law conflicts under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, but refused to do so stating, “[w]ithout a rudder to 
steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of 
balancing coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve 
conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”269  
By failing to create clear choice-of-law rules or a separate 
approach from the one applied to due process inquiries to deal with 
conflicts between state laws when the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
invoked, the Court has gone down the problematic paths that Justice 
Robert H. Jackson identified in his 1945 article, Full Faith and 
                                                 
266 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (“This Court has 
taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both the Due Process 
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In each instance, the Court has 
examined the relevant contacts and resulting interests of the State whose law was 
applied . . . Although at one time the Court required a more exacting standard under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause than under the Due Process Clause for evaluating 
the constitutionality of choice-of-law decisions, . . . the Court has since abandoned 
the weighing-of-interests requirement.”); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 
735 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The minimum requirements imposed by 
the Due Process Clause are, in this context, the same as those imposed by the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.”) 
267 Allstate Insurance Co., 449 U.S. at 321–22 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
268 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
269 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495–99 (2003). 
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Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution.270 Although Justice 
Jackson did not find comfort in the prospect of the Court creating a 
uniform approach to choice-of-law problems, he did identify the 
confusion and difficulties that would arise if the Court did not adopt an 
approach to Full Faith and Credit in relation to public acts: 
 
[T]he available courses from which our choice may 
be made seem to be limited. One is that we will leave 
choice of law in all cases to the local policy of the state. 
This seems to me to be at odds with the implication of 
our federal system that the mutual limits of the states’ 
powers are defined by the Constitution. It also seems 
productive of confusion, for it means that choice among 
conflicting substantive rules depends only upon which 
state happens to have the last word. And that we are not 
likely to accept such a principle is certainly indicated 
by the Court’s sporadic interferences with choice of 
law, whether under the rubric of due process, full faith 
and credit, or otherwise. A second course is that we will 
adopt no rule, permit a good deal of overlapping and 
confusion, but interfere now and then, without 
imparting to the bar any reason by which the one or the 
other course is to be guided or predicted. This seems to 
me about where our present decisions leave us. Third, 
we may candidly recognize that choice-of-law 
questions, when properly raised, ought to and do 
present constitutional questions under the full faith and 
credit clause which the Court may properly decide and 
as to which it ought at least to mark out reasonably 
narrow limits of permissible variation in areas where 
there is confusion.271 
 
                                                 
270 Jackson, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
271 Id. 
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The first and second options identified by Jackson, that choice-of-law 
policy is left to the states and the Court inserts itself intermittently 
without adopting a choice-of-law approach,272 accurately describe the 
current state of the Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence on 
public acts. The Court acknowledged as much in Hyatt: 
 
As Justice Robert H. Jackson . . . aptly observed, 
‘it [is] difficult to point to any field in which the Court 
has more completely demonstrated or more candidly 
confessed the lack of guiding standards of a legal 
character than in trying to determine what choice of law 
is required by the Constitution.’273  
 
However, the Court’s opinion in Hyatt indicates that the Court is not 
inclined to try to create guiding standards or a balancing approach for 
resolving state law conflicts and would only be disposed do so if the 
right case landed on its docket.274  
Additionally, the Court has declared that judicial creation of 
federal common law is only warranted in a few, select 
circumstances.275 In creating federal common law, the Court has stated 
that “‘the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some 
federal policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be 
specifically shown.’”276 Arguably, the interest in national uniformity 
in the administration of bankruptcy cases is a federal policy or interest 
that is violated by the application of non-uniform state choice-of-law 
rules; however, the courts have disagreed on that point.277 
                                                 
272 See id. 
273 Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 496 (quoting Jackson, supra note 1, at 16.). 
274 See id. at 498–99. 
275 Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citing 
O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S.79, 87 (1994)). 
276 Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 
(1966)). 
277 Compare In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The value of 
national uniformity of approach need not be subordinated, therefore, to differences in 
state choice of law rules.”) with In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 
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Although Congress has also been reluctant to use its power under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is better suited to address the 
choice-of-law issue. Moreover, bankruptcy presents Congress an 
opportunity to legislate choice-of-law rules in a discrete area of law. 
From an institutional perspective, Congress is used to balancing 
interests. Every time Congress drafts a new piece of legislation, it 
balances the interests of different constituencies and makes difficult 
choices. In crafting legislation, Congress has the advantage of being 
able to approach issues in a holistic manner, instead of dealing with 
issues on a case-by-case basis, as the courts must do. Instead of 
considering one fact pattern, Congress can look at the big picture in 
drafting choice-of-law rules. Furthermore, the legislative process 
affords Congress several advantages—the ability to hold hearings, 
consider the testimony of a wide variety of scholars and experts, and 
gather as much information as is necessary to analyze the possible 
approaches to choice-of-law in the bankruptcy context. In addition, the 
federal legislative process affords all fifty states the ability to engage 
in the debate over choice-of-law rules through their senators and 
representatives. Finally, Congress has exhibited its ability to deal with 
these issues in the bankruptcy context by creating a choice-of-law rule 
to determine which state’s exemptions a debtor is entitled to claim.278  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
American conflict of laws professors have been engaged in a 
discussion over drafting a Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws for 
over ten years, yet the debate continues.279 The states are following a 
wide variety of state choice-of-law methodologies that produce 
different outcomes in similar cases depending on which state’s choice-
of-law rules are applied. These inconsistent outcomes are at odds with 
                                                                                                                   
2001) (“We find no such federal policy or interest that would be violated, in this 
case, if the choice of law rules of the forum state were utilized.”). 
278 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
279 SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 
22, ¶ 374. 
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the uniform nature of the federal bankruptcy system and impact both 
debtors and creditors. 
The Supreme Court has not provided guidance to the federal 
courts on whether state or federal choice-of-law rules should be 
applied in federal question cases, and as a result, the circuits are split. 
Because the Supreme Court is reluctant to create federal common law 
and Congress, as an institution, is better suited to enact choice-of-laws 
and has the constitutional authority to do so, Congress should enact 
federal choice-of-law rules for bankruptcy cases. A set of federal 
choice-of-law rules for bankruptcy cases would resolve an issue with 
which the federal courts have been grappling for over sixty years and 
ensure uniform treatment of debtors and creditors confronting choice-
of-law issues in the bankruptcy context. 
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